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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This research is devoted to the problem of efficiency of the Russian
Trading System (RTS) securities' prices and their dependence on differ-
ent factors of the economy, including alternative investment opportuni-
ties and the government policy influence upon the financial markets in
Russia. The paper presents the relation between the economic factors
fluctuations and the capital market investors' behavior in terms of profit-
maximizing arbitrage strategies either in the short-run (optional strate-
gies, bid-ask theory, bubble assets studies) or in the long-run (Arbitrage
Pricing Theory and factor analysis). Short-run investments are taken as
the most speculative ones, having their aims in making arbitrage profits,
while the long-run ones are considered as having two sides: for the first,
they should bring operating cash flows and, for the second, they may
lead to capital gains from appreciating assets. The short period of 1.5
years (January 1997 – June 1998) is considered as a period when the
principal Russian financial instruments were liquid enough for statistical
testing of inter-market relations and the respective reinvestment oppor-
tunities. This period is also interesting for researcher because it pre-
ceded the crisis of the Russian financial system in August 1998.
The previous works in the area were mostly concentrated on the studies
of some definite instruments (usually GKO/OFZ government bonds or
foreign currency) or to aggregate Russian stocks indices behavior (see,
for example, Rockinger, Urga, 1998; Ratkovicova, 1998 or Charemza,
et al., 1999; a very careful study of the RTS index dependence on the
DJIA is presented in Chapter 4 of the Russian Academy Institute of
Transition Economics (ITE) monograph "Russian Financial Market De-
velopment and New Investment Instruments", 1998). In this research,
the author proves that the Russian financial market agents normally use
efficient trading strategies though significant cumulative effects are seen
in periods of trend shifts. Special attention is paid to the regulation pol-
icy influence upon some individual RTS listed securities and aggregate
industrial indices, as well as to the explanation of the asset price be-
havior in different branches of economy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of efficiency of the Russian financial market, or at least the
elimination of the bias in its returns forecasts based on economic fac-
tors became extremely important nowadays. Sharp growth of the market
at the end of 1997 was followed by its rapid 1998 devaluation, and in
both cases Western investors had underestimated those effects. Corre-
spondent losses lead to their cumulative run-off the Russian market.
Financial market volatility is widely assumed to be the consequence of
general instability of the Russian economy and politics. It leads to vari-
ous types of inefficiency of the market, from informational to operational
and behavioral ones.
Some recent emerging markets studies (see, for example, Charemza
et al.,1999; Ratkovicova,1998) even avoided the Russian market re-
search. They put forward the basic assumption that the standard (Modi-
gliani–Miller, 1961) unbiased rational expectations hypothesis
At = (1+r)–1 E[At+1|Ωt], (1.1)
where At  and At+1 — asset prices in two consecutive periods, Ωt — mar-
ket information available in moment t, r — the required one-period rate
of return, is violated in the case of the Russian market behavior.
The mentioned papers dealt mostly with Phare countries' capital indices
and ignored the inter-sector arbitrage opportunities of the Russian fi-
nancial market. This paper is considering the optimal investment deci-
sions from the point of view of the possibility of inter-market arbitrage.
The aim of the paper is to prove that the Russian capital market taken
together with other liquid sectors of financial market could be consid-
ered efficient in the weak sense both in the short and in the long run.
Related problem of unbiased and efficient prediction of the future values
of the Russian stocks contains several questions to be answered:
• Which are the economic parameters that could underline the efficient
forecast? From now on, the author refers to parameters determining the
operational cash flows as to fundamental factors of economy while
those depending upon the investors' preferences of market securities
are called speculative ones.
• Can those forecasts be based on operational cash flows of the
stocks (and hence on the fundamental factors, fundamental analysis of
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the returns) or they should be exclusively founded on the analysis of the
previous market returns (technical analysis only)?
• Can state officials influence the market behavior in order to pay more
attention to the real sector securities by changing the government eco-
nomic policy? Which periods are the most convenient for such influ-
ence? For example, it can be supposed that any softening monetary
policy in the periods when the speculative factors dominate, can in-
crease the speculative profit opportunities but hardly affect the real
sector investments or even diminish them. The reason is that principal
investors into Russian financial instruments (investment banks) are
known to be interested in the portfolio speculative profits in such peri-
ods1, and correspondent non-real sector instruments are likely to attract
their investments.
The paper is separated into four Sections, including this Introduction
and Sections 2–4. Sections 2 and 3 deal with statistical testing of some
theoretical equilibrium model of the Russian Trading System (RTS) mar-
ket behavior while Section 4 summarizes the findings.
As it was already mentioned, the research considers the short run and
the long run cases separately. The reason for such differentiation is that
the short run investment decisions are mostly driven by the speculative
investors who earn from frequent reallocation of their portfolios accord-
ing to the speculative value of alternative returns. On the contrary, long
run investors base their decisions upon the forward expectations of such
slowly varying fundamental parameters as the gross demand for indus-
trial output or aggregate price indices.
The short run notation is taken for the models which incorporate inves-
tors' expectations for the stability of alternative rate, the main short run
parameter, behavior.2 In this case, long run parameters determining op-
erational cash flows are modeled perfectly forecasted. Alternatively, the
long run case considers the fluctuating behavior of all the relevant pa-
rameters, and investors have to pay attention to the risk coming from
the highly volatile speculative parameters and from the slowly varying
fundamental factors.
                                               
1 Milovidov (1998) and Machavan, Sofianos (1998) claimed that capital market
professionals increase amount of trades in the periods of high market volatility
making speculations profitable while less experienced operators leave the mar-
ket.
2 Stability of the expected rate behavior can serve as a definition of the short run
for capital market investors (see Brigham, Gapenski, 1993, pp 9–10).
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Section 2 deals with the short run stock market behavior. In the case in-
vestors are believed to know the alternative rates behavior but may ei-
ther wait or not wait for the trend shifts.
In Section 2.1, the standard Froot–Obstfeld (1991) model is used for the
case when investors, being independent and competitive, expect no
possible changes in the short run market behavior. The model shows
that the RTS index value can be divided into three additive terms vari-
ously depending on the alternative rate fluctuations. Each of the terms
was calculated using the RTS market exogenous parameters. Then the
sum of three theoretic values was compared with the actual RTS index.
Reasonable correspondence showed that the term values and underly-
ing short run equilibrium assumptions appeared as valid for the Russian
market as for the more developed ones. For example, fundamental fac-
tor expectations were found significant even for the short run RTS be-
havior.
Section 2.2 deals with the case when investors feel fear (either well-
reasoned or not) of the possible shifts in the short run market trends. It
presents a model in which investors use bid-ask market spreads as
hedging instruments against possible losses. The author shows that
their herding behavior when either putting the 'hot money' to the asset's
market or taking it off may lead to situations when actual trade prices
approach the correspondent bid or ask quotations.3
The results obtained in Section 2.2 show that in this case theoretical
stock value predictions become more biased than in the 'calm' situation.
Their biases depend upon the liquidity of stocks and decrease from the
top-liquid 'blue chips' to the second-rated RTS securities. Of course,
such results could be easily expected a priori.
Section 3 concentrates on the long run behavior studies. It is well-
known (see, for example, Elton, Gruber, 1995, p. 24) that, in this case,
non-biased asset price estimations are given by the so-called Asset
Pricing Theory (APT) model, where (see Ross, 1976) every i-th asset
value follows the formula
.+ = 
1
IbaP
N
j
ijijii ∑
=
ε+  (1.2)
                                               
3 And such market situations are usually proved to show the forthcoming trend
shift (see Colby, Meyers, 1998, p. 17).
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Here Pi stands for the asset's price, Ij is the recent value of the j-th in-
dex (factor) of the market, bij stand for sensitivities of this asset to re-
spective factors, and ai is the mean value of  the asset's price not cap-
tured by the factors. εi is a random residual with mean zero (usually
considered having normal distribution).
It is necessary to mention that more recent attempts to test the well-
developed multi-asset markets such as the NYSE, London or the Phare
countries exchanges are also based upon the APT techniques with
slightly more sophisticated residuals behavior (see Balduzzi, Kallal,
1997; Yu.Li, 1998; Ratkovicova, 1998 and others).
Remark that the statistical significance of the regressive equation (1.2)
with non-correlated residuals means the weak efficiency of the market
in the long run, but the choice of determining factors is nontrivial.4
Moreover, such regression may help to evaluate the efficiency of politi-
cal influence upon the capital market. The significance of individual b-
coefficients may show the possibility to affect the asset's behavior by
changing related factors; the sign of the coefficient provides the direc-
tion of such influence.
Section 3.1 represents the table of pre-determined factors used for re-
gression and their definite explanations and the results of statistical
testing the regression (1.2) for major individual RTS securities over the
period from January, 1997 until June, 1998. Normalized (by the mean
asset prices) b-coefficients are also presented in Section 3.1 in order to
compare the various assets' dependence on the factors.
Section 3.2 deals with the similar regressive analysis but for major RTS
industrial indices calculated as weighted averages of the correspondent
stocks. The test was repeated for each of six 3-month sub-periods of
the total 1.5-year time interval. Changes in regressive coefficient and in
their significance were tested. Percentages of total risk of sector indices
explained by fundamental and speculative factors are used as indicators
of efficiency of a provisional governmental influence upon the corre-
spondent sector behavior in every sub-period. Changes in significance
of sector indices' dependence on the fundamental factors were used for
the explanation of 'importance' of respective industry for the factor de-
termination in the Russian economy.
Finally, Section 3.3 is devoted to verification of the factors set via factor
analysis. The Section results support the choice of pre-determined fac-
                                               
4 The author used the set of factors proposed by Burmeister, McElroy (1987,
1988) for the NYSE market with respective adaptation for the Russian market.
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tors used in the regression. Moreover, it was proved once more that
both speculative and fundamental factors play a significant role in the
RTS securities pricing.
Section 4 summarizes the main results of the paper and discusses un-
derlying assumptions, their limitations, ways of improvement and politi-
cal application.
2. SHORT RUN BEHAVIOR MODELS
AND THEIR STATISTICAL STUDIES
All the models used in Section 2 are based on the various forms of the
so-called Local Expectation Hypothesis (LEH), its first version being the
well-known Modigliani–Miller (1961) equation
).()1( 1
1
+
− ++= tttt PDrP E (2.1)
Here: Pt, Pt+1 are asset's equilibrium prices at times t and t+1; Dt — net
cash flows for the current period for the asset holder; Et stays for in-
vestors' expectations for the next moment given the present; r — effec-
tive rate of return required for the asset (the average rate for alternative
investments).
Continuous time LEH variant (see, for example, Ramaswamy, Sundare-
san, 1986) is equivalent to5
Åt (dPt) + D dt = Pt r dt, (2.2)
where dPt = Pt+dt – Pt. In case D = 0, this comes to the simplest form
Åt (dPt) = Pt r dt. (2.3)
Formulas (2.2), (2.3) imply that the required short-run asset's return has
exactly the alternative rate.
As it was already mentioned, Modigliani–Miller's LEH formula is consis-
tent with the rational expectations hypothesis. If one has some short run
predictions for the alternative rate behavior and expects the cash flows
being constant, this formula provides the theoretical estimate for the as-
set price. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 use different forms of the LEH hypothe-
sis for the short run cases with either no predictions of the market trend
shifts or with them.
                                               
5 The author remarks that LEH continuous time equation (2.2) is not equivalent to
any type of Black–Scholes derivative pricing formula.
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2.1. Froot-Obstfeld model
Froot, Obstfeld (1991) have presented an equilibrium and statistically
testable solution of LEH equation (2.1). In this paper, the author uses
their scheme without any significant changes.
2.1.1. Introduction. Froot and Obstfeld have proved that equilibrium
solution of expectations equation (2.1) consists of three additive terms.
One of them stays for the present value (PV) of expected cash flows of
the asset, and two others are terms originating from instability in eco-
nomics and from imperfect expectations (such terms vanish in abso-
lutely stable and predictable economy):
)2()1(PV
tttt BBPP ++= . (2.4)
Here: PVtP  is the present value term (PV-term), 
)1(
tB  and 
)2(
tB  are insta-
bility terms, depending on different economic variables.
All the three terms turn out to be available for statistical analysis of the
RTS securities (see below). After having calculated theoretically those
terms for the general RTS index, the author compared their sum with
the actual RTS index's value.
The PV term depends on discounted future cash flows, with respect to
the required rate of return (alternative investments rate):
( )
( )∑
∞
=
−+
=
ts
ts
s
st
t
r
D
P
1
PV E , (2.5)
where rs stays for the forward effective rate for the periods [t, s].
The PV term is the most convenient for statistical calculation: both for-
ward alternative rates (daily GKO/OFZ ones) and expected quarterly
cash flows are available for the major RTS listed companies. Daily cash
flows were calculated as 1/90 of the quarterly ones.
The first 'instability' variable )1(B  has the same rate as alternative in-
struments:
tsBrBrB t
ts
sss >+=+=
−
−
,)1()1( )1()1( 1
)1( . (2.6)
This variable has a so-called 'pyramid' (bubble) type structure. It does
not depend upon actual cash flows but depends on the required rate of
return only. Investors know that the variable's growth can not last for-
ever but consider its rate stable in the short run. In the same time, if
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such assets really show the required rate in the short run, investors
have no reasons to abandon them.
(2.6) presents the theoretical method to approximate )1(B . Given the
constant alternative rate of return or the effective rate r time series, one
finds the initial bubble value )1(1B  as a regression coefficient between
the time series sP  of actual asset prices and the series of normalized
bubble sequence tsr tss >+
− ,)1( :
,)1()1( s
ts
sts urBP ++=
−
where us are regressive residuals.6 Since sequence tsr
ts
s >+
− ,)1(
has by definition the same rate as the bubble values, the other two
terms in (2.4) can be considered less correlated with the bubble, and
the regression coefficient being satisfactorily determined.
For simplicity, precise calculations of PV and )1(B  are omitted in the pa-
per.
The second 'instability' variable )2(B  depends on the investors' expecta-
tions of the factors' volatility. In fact, this variable shows the value of the
option not to buy the asset today but to wait for a period for more pre-
cise information, the capital being kept in the risk-free asset. In the
same way as the PV term does, this component depends on temporary
cash flows and the alternative rate of return. The form of dependence is
based on the stochastic behavior of economic factors that needs to be
tested. Calculations concerning )2(B  are presented in Section 2.1.3, af-
ter the alternative rate having been previously tested in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.2. Statistical analysis of the alternative rate. In Section 2, the
author used the GKO/OFZ index rates (calculated from the MICEX clos-
ing weekly averages of 1 + year to maturity bonds) as the proxy for the
alternative investments rates.
For GKO/OFZ rates, Hull–White (1987) hypothesis was tested:
( ) dzdtrtKdt σ+−= )(M . (2.7)
Here: M = M(t) is the expected rates linear trend, z stands for standard
Wiener process, and K and σ are the coefficients of the bonds rates
                                               
6 Of course, only standard OLS assumptions are made for statistical behavior of
us, hence limiting the consistency of the regression.
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adjustment.7 (2.7) is an extended variant of Vasicek (1977) mean-
reversal model. The model became a popular instrument for testing the
possibly controlled asset behavior.
Ki parameter, linear trend Mi(t) = α + βit coefficients and volatility pa-
rameter σi are considered stable through each of five sub-periods of re-
spective uniformity of rates behavior (i = 1, 2, …, 5 — the same periods
were also studied by Chetverikov, 1998) (see. Fig. 1).
Statistically, discrete variant of equation (2.7)
( ) .)( ,1,, tiitiiiti rtKDr εσ+−β+α= − (2.8)
was tested. D stays for the first difference, and ti,ε  is the sequence of
standard i.i.d. normal variables (316 daily observations used), i =
1, 2, …, 5.
The author points out that (2.8) contains only three (not four) independ-
ent parameters to be tested. The volatility parameter σi can be chosen
                                               
7 For 1997 – early 1998, some Russian financial officials (see A.Chubais's inter-
view to The Financial Times, Feb.10, 1997) claimed that the state was interested
in keeping the long-run GKO/OFZ rate at about 20–30% with decreasing trend. If
M appeared insignificantly different from this value, we could claim that the bond
market was controlled by the state. Otherwise, we should prove the hypothesis
that this market was weakly influenced by the state.
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Figure 1. GKO/OFZ rates: actual (MICEX) (thick curve, left scale) and
predicted by the model (thin curve, right scale).
Ri(t) = Ri(t–1) +Ki(Mi(t–1) – Ri(t–1)),  i = 1, 2, ..., 5
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as the minimum of the mean variance of the following variables, which
are supposed to be gaussian and independent of each other:
))(( 1,,, −−β+α−=εσ tiiititii rtKrD , (2.9)
( )))((var)(var 1,,,2 −−β+α−=εσ=σ tiiiititiii rtKrD ,
i = 1, 2, …, 5. The variance of variables (2.9) is considered as the func-
tion of Ki, αi and βi free parameters, the latter being derived as those
minimizing the value of 2iσ .
This approach is well known to support robust estimates of parameters
with only approximated confidence intervals (see Mills, 1996). To use it,
one has to check, for each i, two statistical hypotheses: 1) that variables
(2.9) have the features of i.i.d. normal variables, and 2) that equation
(2.8) is statistically significant.
Say, for the first (i = 1) sub-period (58 observations), the following re-
sults were obtained:
K1 = 0.448,     M1(t) = –88.810 + 0.003t,     σ1 = 2.98%
(MS Word data t format used).
Wald–Wolfowitz rank serial correlation test was used for checking the
corresponding of (2.9) variables to simulated normal distribution N(0,
0.0298). Wald–Wolfowitz statistics8 was equal to U(316) = 2977, thus
supporting the N(0, 0.0298)-hypothesis at 1% confidence level.
We present the graph of actual GKO/OFZ MICEX index rates and their
values predicted by equation (2.8) (see Fig. 1). One can see that the
model adequacy is quite satisfactory (R2 = 0.98 for average). Note that
vertical axe's scale has been shifted for convenience.
Decreasing trend of the GKO/OFZ rates was not found, thus supporting
the hypothesis that the GKO/OFZ market was weakly governed by the
state. Moreover, volatility parameters σi appeared to be very unstable
(see Table 1).
2.1.3. Optional term calculations and remarks on price-variance
relations. After having determined the form of alternative rate behavior,
                                               
8 Sum of σ1e1, t's ranks in their rank series mixed together with 58 of N(0,.0298)
independent simulations. The standard Neyman–Pearson criterion was not used
for difficulties in quantiles calculation of N(0,.0298) distribution because of its lit-
tle variance. Nevertheless, for the high volatility sub-periods i = 3 and 5 this cri-
terion performed better.
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we can write the partial equation for the dependence of the optional
term of asset's price upon the cash flow and the rate level. We use the
LEH formula (2.2) as the base for the equation:
rdtBDdtdB ttt
)2()2( )( =+E (2.10)
Posing ),()2()2( ttt rtBB = , we write the standard Itô-type formula:
2)2(
2
2
2
1)2()2()2( )()()( dtB
r
dtB
r
dtB
t
dB ttttttt EEE ∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
= . (2.11)
Using (2.7), (2.10), (2.11) and the standard hypothesis for dividend in-
come of the Russian companies' stockholders D = D0 = const, we ob-
tain the equation
rdtBDdtdtB
r
dtrtMB
r
KdtB
t ttiitit
)2()2(
2
2
2
2
1)2()2( ))(( =+
∂
∂
σ+−
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
.
After getting rid of dt, we obtain the final form for )2(B :
,)0,(,0),0(
,))((
)2()2(
)2()2(
2
2
2
2
1)2()2(
tDtBrB
rBDB
r
rtMB
r
KB
t
ti
ttiitit
−==
=
∂
∂
σ+−
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
(2.12)
for each i-th sub-period.
Boundary condition 0),0()2( =rBi  sets an initial scale of the variable,
while condition tDtBt −=)0,(
)2(  shows that the investor who receives
dividends but earns nothing on the whole, must suffer capital losses.
Table 1. Hull–White coefficient.
Sub-periods
Coefficient
1 2 3 4 5
σi, %   2.98 2.74   9.58   1.52   16.22
Ki   0.448 0.213   0.533   0.062   3.216
αi –88.81 0.02 –47.92   14.12 –3.10
βi   3.1 0.2   15.5 –0.3   5.1
F   11.03*** 2.92*   3.96**   3.41**   15.08***
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Testing the numerical solution of (2.12) (MathCad 6.0 package used)
shows that the approximate form of dependence
),/)(ln(0.038 20
)2( rtMDB iit σ=      i = 1, 2, ..., 5. (2.13)
has a 95.3% average correlation with the obtained numerical solution of
(2.12)9 (total interval from January 1997 until June 1998 considered).
We found that the optional term in the Froot-Obstfeld decomposition
has the (approximately) negative logarithmic dependence on the varia-
tion of the alternative rate of return. Close hypothesis was considered
by Li (1998), but he posed the negative dependence of the asset price
upon the volatility logarithms a priori. Simple negative correlation was
tested several times for the American (NYSE) stock market (see, for ex-
ample, Connor, Korajdzyk, 1986).
To obtain more sound results on negative correlation of the RTS index
alternative instruments volatility, the author tested three periods with the
close mean GKO rates (about 37%), but various bond market behavior
(see Fig. 2; these are sub-periods of the time intervals of more or less
stable behavior of GKO/OFZ rates — see Fig. 1 for periods 1, 2 and 4):
1) January 1997 – February 1997 (a period with stable growth of the
rates with little short-run variance); 2) March 1997 – May 1997 (de-
                                               
9  (2.13) was obtained as a logarithmic function that fits best the numerical solu-
tion of (2.12) (square loss function used).
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Figure 2. RTS index (thick curve, left scale) and state GKO/OFZ
bonds rates (thin curve, right scale).
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creasing of rates with high volatility); 3) February – April 1998 (stabiliza-
tion of the rates with low volatility).
The research of the RTS index for those three periods proves that the
lower volatility in alternative speculative rates raises the agents' interest
to the RTS market (see Fig. 2: lower bond market volatility periods coin-
cide with the local RTS index maximum and vice versa). Statistics also
supports the hypothesis that the short-run (3-days) GKO hourly rates
volatility has a negative correlation with RTS index. RTS-GKO indices co-
integration was not directly tested though some evidence was found
(see below).
2.1.4. Comparing the theoretical (Froot–Obstfeld) and actual RTS
indices. We have tested the fitting of the Russian financial market to
the theory developed by Froot–Obstfeld.
In Fig. 3, the author presents the actual RTS index and its proxy calcu-
lated from the three previously mentioned terms: the PV-type term (2.5),
the bubble term (2.6) and the optional term (2.13). The correspondence
was significant at 1% level (F316 = 47.25), R2 = 84.6%, thus proving that
Froot–Obstfeld model could satisfactorily explain the RTS behavior in
periods when the situation proved stable.
We see from Fig. 3 that the difference between the actual RTS index
(RTSA) and its theoretical proxy (RTST) increases during the sub-period
I and decreases during II. Those were stages of a favorable (increasing)
and unfavorable trends of the Russian market behavior, respectively.
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Figure 3. RTS index: actual (thick curve) and theoretically
calculated (thin curve).
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Thorough study of those periods shows the substantial difference be-
tween the behavior of those indices.
For both sub-periods, mentioned difference between the actual and
theoretically calculated RTS indices was studied:
)()()( RTSTRTSA it
i
t
i
te −= ,     i = 1, 2.
Linear trend coefficients appeared 1%-significant for both sub-periods'
differences (t stays for a day in each sub-period). They demonstrated
increasing and decreasing trends, respectively:
)1()1( 038.23.106 tt ute ++−= ,
.821.194.88 )2()2( tt ute +−=
The result can be explained by the fact that the second (bubble) term in
the Froot–Obstfeld theoretical decomposition was calculated as de-
pending on alternative rate only. This method ignores changes in total
capitalization of the Russian financial markets.
In fact, the actual RTS index shows the stock market capitalization ade-
quately, while the rate of return of competitive markets (say, GKO/OFZ
or forex ones) does not depend of their capitalization.10 The ratio of the
stock market and the 1997–1998 bond market capitalization  reveal lin-
ear trends with slopes close to those discussed above (see also Chet-
verikov, 1999). More formally, this result should be a consequence of
co-integration of the GKO/OFZ and RTS markets capitalizations.
The last hypothesis was tested indirectly via the co-integration between
the RTS and GAZPROM stock market capitalization (percentage ratio to
the January 1, 1997 value) and the Central Bank currency reserves (the
same ratio). This approach was used because the GKO/OFZ market
value seemed inadequate for testing the bond market investments be-
cause it included a great amount of the GKO/OFZ issues held by the
CBR and Sberbank. It was found that the time series (RTScap, CBRres)
demonstrated a 5%-significant CI(2, 1) co-integration behavior. Chet-
verikov came to close results.
It seems more interesting that errors' ut behavior appeared quite differ-
ent along two sub-periods. For the first sub-period (increasing trend),
they showed a significant ARCH(1)-behavior:
.4406.01.1572)1t|(,5412.046.12 2 1
2
1 −− +=−++= ttttt vvvuu E
                                               
10 Note that the GKO/OFZ index was calculated from the bond yields to maturity
and hence did not take into account the market capitalization.
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where )1t|( 2 −tvE  stays for the ut's conditional variance given the past
)1.3591)(( 2 =tuE . These coefficients appeared at least 15%-significant
for each 3-month sub-subperiod of the first sub-period (usually,
5%-significant). On the contrary, during the second sub-period (de-
creasing trend), the errors ut showed 10%-insignificant autoregressive
structure of squares )4.906)(( 2 =tuE .
In the case of the first sub-period, ut demonstrated heteroscedastic be-
havior with increasing variance (LM tests were used — see Engle, 1982),
while the second period showed no heteroscedasticity. In the first case,
no significant autoregressive structure was found for vt (Box–Ljung tests
were used).
Note also that mean variance of errors ut is considerably higher during
the first sub-period than during the second one. This fact proves the
well-known hypothesis that growing markets behave differently from
each other while shrinking ones show the tendency to uniform
behavior.11
The same fact can explain the various autoregressive structure of ut.
Actually, when markets show different behavior, investors have to use
some backward analysis for each of them, and hence errors in differ-
ence between the market indices become considerable and depend on
the past. And when markets demonstrate more uniform behavior, differ-
ence between their indices have decreasing trend with random fluctua-
tions only, the latter being respectively small.
2.2. Bid-ask spreads as trend indicators
It is widely accepted that the Russian financial market situation remains
very unstable, and sharp changes in agents behavior may follow shifts in
its economic and institutional framework. Consequently, any model that
incorporates LEH without any corrections for the possible trend shifts is
valid only for a very short period. Say, in Section 2.1 the author had to
consider several periods with different rate behavior models. In this
Section, he tries to apply the original model for the RTS market bid-ask
quotations spreads as arbitrageurs' hedging instruments against the
possible trend shifting.
The problem of bid–ask spreads was widely studied in the literature
(see, for instance, Ahn, Cao, Choe, 1996; Harris, 1994; Glosten, Harris,
                                               
11 The author explaines the trends in et's behavior by the capitalization effects —
see above.
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1988 etc.) but they considered the spreads as an essential result  of
such market inefficiencies as transaction costs or informational asym-
metries. Nevertheless, spreads could be explained, partially at least, by
the market volatility. Market agents try to diminish risks evolving from
the market fluctuations, but they usually try also to avoid the costly di-
rect hedging, and therefore, market price disparities appear.
2.2.1. Preliminary remarks. Suppose a trader decides to rearrange
his market portfolio to improve its efficiency. Normally, exchange regu-
lations require that the agent primarily resells the 'low return' assets to
another investor for cash and uses the received cash for buying the
more effective investments.12 In the same time, the second agent can
also buy the 'high return' asset himself.13 That means that, in the first
case, the first arbitrageur makes the second to buy the low return asset
instead of the high return one for the latter's cash and buys the high
return asset himself for the second's cash. In the equilibrium, such
contract can be ensured only if the first agent agrees for the lower than
the market price for his asset. Such discount can be considered as an
exit price for the agent who wants to leave the ineffective asset market
for cash. Respectively, those who want to enter the high return market
should pay the entrance price with some markup to the average market
value.
We call the discounted price a bid quotation; analogously, we deal with
the ask quotation which is higher than the market average. Actual trades
often use prices in between the bid and ask levels but if many agents
believe that the asset price will fall soon, then the actual price may ap-
proach the bid quotation because everybody will want to sell the asset.
Similarly, if the asset is to appreciate, than the asset is traded for ap-
proximately the ask price.
2.2.2. Model development. Let the market price P of the asset A fol-
low the geometric Brownian motion
dP = P(µdt + σdz), (2.14)
where z stands for the standard Wiener process.
Let the agents evaluate A by bid and ask quotations that differ from the
market average by some percentage discount or markup:
Pb = (1–∆b)P,     Pa = (1+∆a)P.
                                               
12 Short positions limitations are rather strict in the RTS case.
13 This choice is better because the first agent prefers it.
2. SHORT RUN BEHAVIOR MODELS AND THEIR STATISTICAL STUDIES 21
where Pb and Pa are the bid and ask quotations, respectively. ∆b and ∆a
are considered stable exogenous habitual parameters.14
Financial agents may either:
1) keep in cash; in this case, they have an opportunity to operate with
absolutely liquid alternative investments with return r (GKO/OFZ index
and USD investments were considered as alternative instruments for the
RTS assets);
2) hold asset A that provides cash flow D per period; in this case, in-
vestors are not able to make alternative investments until they sell the
asset for cash and hence appear in position 1).
In addition, we assume that any agent can sell the asset for a bid price
or buy it for an ask one. If the market price falls to some level P = ∗P ,
investors will expect it to grow; in this case, they will agree to buy the
asset even for the ask price Pa = (1 + ∆a) ∗P . On the contrary, if the
price grows up to P = ∗P > ∗P , then the asset can be sold even for bid
price Pb = (1 – ∆b) ∗P  because traders expect that asset's price will
soon fall.15
Note that agents who currently keep in alternative instruments do have
an (informal) option to enter the asset market any time they want (to
buy the asset for its ask price). Respectively, the recent asset holders
have the right to get the cash flow D per period together with an option
to sell the asset for its bid price. The values of their positions F and V,
respectively, satisfy the following second-order differential equations
(see Appendix A, part1):
,022
2
1
=−
′µ+″σ FrFPFP (2.15)
.022
2
1
=+−′µ+″σ DVrVPVP (2.16)
Equation (2.15) is valid while investors keep in cash and do not buy the
                                               
14 This fact can not be tested statistically, as ∆b and ∆a are not observable pa-
rameters — see below. Instead, one can test the stability of the bid-ask spreads
percentage. For example, for the assets listed in Appendix B, its autocorrelation
assumption was rejected at 10% level of significance in the favor of the constant
values hypothesis.
15 If ∗≤ PP  then all investors hold asset the A (at least as a part of their portfo-
lio), and if ∗≥ PP  then everybody keeps an alternative instrument.
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asset A for its ask price, i.e. when the current price level is above
∗∗ ≥ PPP : . Analogously, (2.16) is valid at least for 
∗≤ PP . Both the val-
ues of F and V can be calculated from (2.15) and (2.16), respectively,
for P ∈ [ ∗P ,
∗P ].
These equations require four constant parameters in addition to the two
yet unknowns ∗P  and P*. On the whole, one must present six conditions
to make the system solvable.
Four conditions follow from definition of points ∗P  and P*. In fact, they
are the points where asset A is actually traded for the ask price or for
the bid price, respectively:
).()1()(
),()1()(
b
a
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
=∆−+
=∆++
PVPPF
PVPPF
(2.17)
Moreover, ∗P  (respectively, P*) is the point where investors begin to buy
the asset A for the ask price if the market price falls to that level (begin
to sell it if the price rises to P*). This condition is equivalent to the
statement that ∗P  is a point of a local minimum of a loss function of
those agents who buy assets for the ask price (P* is a point of a local
minimum of a loss for those selling for the bid price).
More specifically, this provides the following transversality conditions:
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(2.18)
Two more conditions can be derived from the common observation that:
• nobody should buy an enormously expensive asset: if P → +∞ then
the option to buy the asset devaluates:
F(+∞) = 0. (2.19)
• nobody should ever sell the asset that brings positive cash flows for
too little price: if P → 0+ then the value of an option to sell the asset
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vanishes and the position of those investors who hold the asset A ap-
proaches the present value of the future cash flows:
V(0) = D/r. (2.20)
This formula does not imply the stable alternative rate r. It simply shows
that, at any moment, investors use the recently required rate for dis-
counting cash flows.
Equations (2.15) and (2.16) have the following general solutions
,/)(
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21
21
21
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+=
ββ
ββ
 (2.21)
where β1 and β2 are negative and positive roots of the following quad-
ratic equation, respectively:
0)1(2
2
1
=−βµ+−ββσ r (2.22)
(see Appendix A, part 2).
Note that these two roots are always real because the (2.22)'s quadratic
discriminant 222 2)2/( σ+σ−µ r  is positive if alternative rate r is
positive.16 They are different in sign because their product 2/2 σ− r  is
negative. Moreover, the alternative rate r appears greater than the mean
growth parameter µ (see Appendix B).17
As β1 and β2 are negative and positive, respectively, equations (2.19)
and (2.20) lead to A2 = 0 and B1 = 0.
2.2.3. RTS securities selection and basic hypotheses testing.
Before applying the above theoretical results for the RTS assets one
must test their geometric Brownian motion behavior (2.14). Such be-
havior was studied separately for each of the two time intervals: the
boom period of RTS history (from January 1997 until November 1997)
and the recession period (from November 1997 until June 1998; see
Fig. 3). For discrete time series, the following model was used:
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P
PP
εσ+µ=−
−
−      i = 1, 2, (2.23)
                                               
16 Here, maximum of the short-term GKO/OFZ index rate and MICEX daily cur-
rency growth rate weekly averages were used; consequently, r was evidently
positive.
17 Hence, β2 > 1 as the quadratic trinomial (2.22) is negative at β = 1.
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where ????ε  stay for independent standard normal variables and t denotes
the day of the i-th sub-period. Real returns were used here.
All the RTS securities were divided into three groups:18 1) top liquid
'blue chips' such as UES, Lukoil, Mosenergo, Rostelecom together with
GAZPROM and Surgutneftegaz stocks; 2) second-class blue chips in-
cluding the other telecommunications and electricity and oil companies;
3) assets with lower liquidity, especially machinery, transport and trading
companies.
Note that the first group companies have immense and non-stable cash
flows and extremely volatile stocks with small dividends. The second
group has fluctuating assets with stable cash flows (this applies espe-
cially to local telecommunication and electricity companies) while the
third one has relatively little cash flows and less liquid stocks.
The author tested the following six stocks: UES (EESR) and Lukoil ones
belonging to the first group, St.Petersburg Telecom (SPTL) and Oren-
burgneft (ORNB) oil company stocks belonging to the second and GUM
(GUMM) and KAMAZ (KMAZ) ones belonging to the third. In addition,
the same calculation was conducted for the general RTS index. RTS
closing real prices (weekly moving averages) were used.
All of the assets tested showed at least 5%-significance of a daily dis-
crete geometric growth (2.23). It is interesting that the first group assets
show a 1%-significant positive ARCH-behavior of statistically calculated
residuals εt (for both the first and the second periods of time); for ex-
ample, for the EESR stock, the following results were obtained:
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with 5%–insignificant autocorrelation structure of ut's. Remark that both
autoregressive coefficient and constant term appeared higher during the
market recession. Such ARCH-behavior could be explained by investors'
belief that each market shock (either negative or positive) had longer in-
fluence upon the asset behavior in the recession period.
For the second group assets, 10%-significant ARCH effects were also
found out, but the signs of their coefficients were non-constant, while
for the third group no autocorrelation of residuals was found.
                                               
18 For the simplicity reasons, the author assumed the RTS asset markets being
independent of each other but depending on the alternative rate behavior.
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2.2.4. Statistical results and their possible explanation. Required
(alternative) rates were taken on a daily basis as a maximal value of a
daily GKO/OFZ index's returns (calculated from the weekly closing aver-
age MICEX yields to maturity) and the USD growth MICEX weekly clos-
ing average rates. For convenience, eight rate levels were used: from
35%–45% until 105%–115% with 10% steps (see Appendix B).
The percentage values of bid discounts ∆b and ask markups ∆a were
considered to equal one half of the RTS closing bid-ask spreads (for the
RTS index — to one half of the weighted bid and ask quotation spreads).
Quarterly cash flows were uniformly distributed among daily periods.
For the days of both sub-periods under consideration (from January
1997 until November 1997 and from November 1997 until June 1998),
the values of F(P) and V(P) were calculated from the RTS asset prices
with respect to the correspondent alternative rate levels. ∗P  and 
∗P
prices were theoretically calculated to satisfy (2.17) and (2.18).
For each sub-period and for correspondent rate levels, actual market
price levels were taken when actual prices approached the bid or ask
RTS quotations. Such levels were determined as the average prices of
the daily periods when more than 50% of the correspondent hourly av-
erages appeared twice closer to, say, the bid quotations than to the ask
ones.
Data of any price level were considered as a sample of a normal distri-
bution, and the maximum likelihood procedure was used to test whether
its mean equals the value of either ∗P  or 
∗P .
Formally, the hourly trade averages P1, P2, ..., Pk (k = 1, 2, ..., 7) taken
from the same sub-period and rate level interval, were filtered for lying
in either the interval
[ ]3/)2(, abb QQQPi +∈    or   ],,3/)2[( aba QQQPi +∈
where Qb and Qa  stay for the mean bid and ask quotations of the same
hourly periods, respectively.
Then the mean value m  for the chosen sub-sample Ck
CC PPP ...,,, 21
the latter being considered to have the gaussian N(m, s2) distribution,
was tested by the maximum likelihood procedure for being equal to ei-
ther ∗P  or 
∗P .
The calculation results are presented in Appendix B. The table contains,
for each of the alternative rate levels, the low and high price levels ∗P
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and ∗P  calculated theoretically from the the mean growth rates m and
mean deviations s for the six RTS stocks and the RTS index (general).
Bolded figures mean that the correspondent price average is 5%-sig-
nificantly equal to the correspondent theoretical value.
For the EESR and Lukoil stocks and for the RTS index the prices ap-
proaching the bid quotations normally appeared significantly close to
the high price level. Such a phenomenon was found for the 'overheated'
RTS market in the autumn of 1997. Nevertheless, in contrary to the
above theory, when the prices appeared close to the correspondent ∗P
values, they were also close to the respective bid quotations (the reces-
sion period in the early summer of 1998 when the huge number of in-
vestors left the RTS market; in this period, ask quotations were lower
than the correspondent ∗P  values). Panic expectations appeared to
more significant for the investors' behavior than attractive opportunities
to buy cheap assets.
This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that top liquid RTS as-
sets (the first group) are mostly traded by the investors who have similar
expectations for the future growth opportunities and same loss avoiding
strategies. Hence, they enter and leave the market simultaneously. As
the RTS index capitalization bases mostly on the leading blue chips, its
behavior proved to be generally the same.
The second group (SPTL and ORNB) assets behave quite differently.
Their prices approached neither theoretically expected high price levels
∗P  nor the correspondent ∗P  values (in fact, they remained between
these boundaries). That means that the second group assets' volatility is
lower than those theoretically calculated.
The result can be explained by the fact that the second group RTS
stocks (and especially the stocks of the telecommunication sector —
SPTL) are mainly owned by the investors who are known to prefer stable
cash outcomes to opportunities to gain from speculative trades.
Finally, the third group (GUMM and KMAZ) assets bid quotations were
again found approaching the high price level ∗P . But their ask quota-
tions do not approach the correspondent ∗P  values. Moreover, they ap-
peared significantly lower than the theoretically calculated values.
The analysis reveals that such assets behave as highly speculative ones.
Investors trade them only when their prices are high because nobody
wishes to get any cash from their poor dividends, and this can explain
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the finding. Nobody is interested in such assets during unfavorable peri-
ods, and their prices break the theoretically calculated low price bound-
ary.
3. LONG RUN MODELS AND STATISTICAL TESTS
All the models used in Section 3 are based on the standard Arbitrage
Pricing Theory (APT) of financial assets' regressive dependence on
some exogenous economic variables (factors).
The techniques was introduced by Ross (Ross, 1976) who analyzed the
OLS regressive equation
∑
=
ε++=
N
j
ijijii IbaP
1
,
Here Pi stands for the asset's price, Ij is the recent value of the j-th in-
dex (factor) of the market, bij stand for sensitivities of this asset to cor-
respondent factors, and  ai  is the mean value of  the asset's price not
captured by the factors. εi is a random residual with mean zero (usually
considered to have normal distribution). For convenience, random errors
εi  are usually assumed non-correlated with factor variables.
Since then, the model has been improved and modified for many times.
See Chen, Roll, Ross (1986), Burmeister, McElroy (1987, 1988), Bal-
duzzi, Kallal (1997), Li (1998), Rockinger, Urga (1998), Charemza
et al. (1999) and others who studied the developed Western markets or
the CEE indices (the last two papers used GARCH/EGARCH statistical
methods). A group of the IET (1999) researchers studied the Russian
case.
Let there exist M < N fundamental (economic, EF) factors I1, I2, …, IM,
among N ones under consideration, while others being speculative ones
(SF). Then the risk of holding the i-th asset has the form of Burmeister–
McElroy's (Burmeister, McElroy, 1987) statistical decomposition
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where 21iσ  and 
2
2iσ  are non-diversifiable risk components related to
economic and speculative factors, and iεvar  is the i-th asset's price
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specific risk. In this case, one can study the asset's dependence of on
the fundamental and speculative factors, hence coming to some conclu-
sions on whether it is worth to influence the asset behavior by changing
any variables under the government control.19
The main problem when using APT is whether the set of factors I1,       
I2, ..., IN is adequate for the national economy. For the Russian case,
the author used, with respective modifications, the set of pre-
determined factors established by Chen, Roll, Ross (1986) for the NYSE
market (see Section 3.1). Those variables were  used initially for individ-
ual RTS assets and then, in Section 3.2, industrial sector indices were
studied from the point of view of political influence possibility. Finally,
the chosen factors were tested via the factor analysis (see Section 3.3).
3.1. Factors' definition and statistical
results for the individual stocks
3.1.1. RTS factors specification and EF-SF classification. Before
the presentation of statistical results, it seems necessary to discuss
briefly the specification of the regressive parameters and the reasons of
their assignment to groups of economic (EF) or speculative (SF) factors.
As it was mentioned above, the parameters set was taken from the pa-
per by Chen, Roll, Ross and then adapted for the Russian market.
                                               
19 Note that the sum of the first (PV) and the third components of the Froot–
Obstfeld decomposition (2.4) .)( )1()2( tttt BBPVP ++= can be called the fundamental
value of the asset, and the second one can be called the speculative value. Actu-
ally, two variables in the brackets depend on both economic and speculative vari-
ables while  the third one depends on EFs only. Hence, we have arrived at the
Burmeister-McElroy decomposition independently.
Table 2. APT factors for the RTS market.
Factor Group Factors' specifications and their attachment
to certain groups
GDP value EF The selection of this factor is based upon the implicit hy-
pothesis that the (nominal) value of the gross demand of
economy must affect uniformly all the main sectors' out-
puts. This implies a more or less stable velocity of ad-
aptation of the leading firms' output to the changes of
the GDP.
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Continued from p. 28
Factor Group Factors' specifications and their attachment
to certain groups
GDP value EF This is quite reasonable for the Russian economy. In
fact, in economies with stable vertical (supplier-con-
sumer) relations, changes in the final demand must rap-
idly and adequately affect the correspondent changes in
the output of all firms in the production chain. Moreover,
such an affect is supported by the leading financial
groups that usually control all the firms in a chain (see,
for example, Milovidov, 1998 or Dementyev, 1998). GDP
value is an inappropriate measure for the total expendi-
tures in transition economies (see V. Polterovich, 1998),
but it is one of the variables that attract actual attention
of financial agents (Mirkin, 1998).
The GDP is classified as an economic (not speculative)
factor, because it does not affect any short-run inves-
tors' interests but may affect the firm's output in the
long-run (see above).
The actual GDP value is unavailable for the researcher
because of significant informal ('shadow') sector in Rus-
sia. The author ignores the informal sector in this paper
(i.e., only taxable GDP estimations are used), as the RTS
listed companies belong mostly to the legal economy
sector and their major suppliers and consumers do the
same. Hence, their operations must depend mostly on
the formal GDP value.
Formal GDP ex post estimations for weekly periods were
assumed equal to 0.25 of the GDP's monthly values.
2-month (approx.) lag was chosen by maximum correla-
tion procedure.
Price index
(CPI)
EF This factor affects the cash inflows and outflows for both
companies and households.
For Russian economy, there exist two types of market-
able products: in monopolized sectors of the market
(such as electricity and gas services, railway transport
and others, including various intermediate goods) and
highly competitive markets of consumption goods. The
market prices for the first type of goods are usually
regulated by the state (federal and municipal) officials.
Second-type prices are stable enough provided the first-
type prices and the tax policy are predictable. Hence,
the Russian short-run inflation affects the economy
through the political shocks, and hence can be called
the speculative factor. The long-run inflation is, on the
contrary, a fundamental factor for any country, because
it affects both the operational costs and prices and the
discount rate required for the long-run.
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Continued from p. 29
Factor Group Factors' specifications and their attachment
to certain groups
Price index
(CPI)
EF More or less predictable economic policy in 1997 —
spring 1998 allows to claim inflation as more fundamen-
tal (not speculative) factor for the period, while short-
time tax attacks for some sectors of economy, rising un-
expectedly their costs in the middle of 1998, may show
that the period of speculative inflation has begun.
Ex post inflation index was used according to the State
Statistical Committee's estimations. 3-month lag was
chosen by the maximum correlation procedure. Weekly
CPI values were considered as 0.25 of the monthly ones.
Federal
GKO/OFZ
(and
Moscow
municipal)
bonds price
index
SF This is the main variable that determines the traders' re-
quired rate of return.
This factor is considered as a speculative one because
of being frequently varying and affecting the agents'
choice between the state (federal and municipal) debt
instruments and corporate assets. As an alternative to
the RTS stocks, the debt instruments determine the re-
quired rate of return in every short-run period and have
no influence upon any firm's long-run operational activi-
ties.
MICEX closing prices weekly mean averages were used
(1Y+ to maturity). The bonds' price index was calculated
using the bonds' effective rates to maturity.
Default risk
premium
SF This factor determines the default risk of the Russian
economy.
It is considered as a speculative factor because it shows
the Russia's investments rating among the emerging
markets.
The factor was calculated as the difference between the
average credit rate of the Expert magazine top rating
banks and the CBR's rate.
Foreign
currency
exchange
rates
SF This factor is the second one by importance that deter-
mines both the alternative rate of return and the inflation
rate.
The mean return from the foreign currency investments
is usually compared with the 'risk-free' return based on
its expected growth because of the Central Bank's corri-
dor.
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Continued from p. 30
Factor Group Factors' specifications and their attachment
to certain groups
Foreign
currency
exchange
rates
SF Because the forex market is one of the most volatile
ones in Russia, such investments are usually considered
to be speculative ones. In addition, the exchange rate
affects the price level in Russia because the country's
economy depends strongly upon the export/import op-
erations. In this paper, the author is mostly interested in
the first (speculative) influence of the factor, and so we
use the real exchange rate to eliminate the price effect.
The real USD exchange rates were used (MICEX daily
closing averages with weekly MA smoothing and CPI
adjustment).
Additive
constant
SF This variable shows the possible short-term advan-
tages/disadvantages of holding the asset compared to
other assets with the same factor dependencies.
The factor is speculative by definition. It represents the
constant term in the regression.
3.1.2. Pre-determined factors model. The following model with pre-
determined factors was chosen for testing the individual regressive APT
coefficients for the most liquid RTS stocks for the period of January
1997 – June 1998 (316 observations on the whole):
Pit   = iα +
)1(
iβ (PCRt – CBRt) + )2(iβ GKO1Yt  + )3(iβ EXRt +
      + )4(iβ GDPt–40 + )5(iβ RTSt  + )6(iβ CPIt–60 + itε . (3.2)
Here: Pit  stands for the i-th RTS asset's price time series (weekly clos-
ing moving averages), t is the number of the RTS/MICEX trading day, αi
is the component not covered by the other factors, PCRt is the prime
rating banks' credit rate for corporate clients (weekly ex-post moving
averages), CBRt is the Central Bank's interest rate, PCRt – CBRt stands
for the default risk factor, GKO1Yt  stays for the MICEX closing GKO in-
dex (1Y+ to maturity weekly moving averages), EXRt stands for the real
USD exchange rates, GDPt is the gross taxable domestic product (0.25
of the monthly values), RTSt stands for the RTS index, CPIt represents
the CPI index, and ??ε  are non-correlated gaussian residuals.
Regressive parameters were estimated by the standard 2SLS procedure
after removing the regressors' cross-correlation (Statistica 5.0 package
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was used) – see Appendix C. Statistical significance of the obtained co-
efficients and their signs were also tested.
In addition, normalized regressive coefficients were calculated by divi-
sion of the equation (3.2) by the mean price values:
P
 Pit  = 
P
iα  + 
P
i
)1(β
(PCRt – CBRt) + 
P
i
)2(β
GKO1Yt  + 
P
i
)3(β
EXRt +
       + 
P
i
)4(β
GDPt–40 + 
P
i
)5(β
RTSt  + 
P
i
)6(β
CPIt–60 + itε′ , (3.3)
where P  stands for the average value of the i-th security for the period
of January 1997 – June 1998, and itε′  are random residuals. (3.3) helps
to compare different stocks' dependence on the economic variables.
3.1.3. Discussion of the main findings. The chosen set of pre-
determined variables (6 factors used) appeared 1%-level significant for
all RTS leading securities. Moreover, R2 coefficient appeared to be not
less than 0.86 — see Appendix C.
This finding supports the hypothesis that the Russian financial market is
yet enough simple and incomplete. Note that Fama, McBeth (1973)
used 10 variables to reach the correspondence level R2 = 0.93 for the
American (NYSE) market. The topic was discussed in more details by,
e.g., Milovidov (1998). We should also mention that Rockinger and Urga
(1998) have claimed that the Russian market demonstrated a tendency
towards efficiency. However, they had studied an earlier period (starting
from 1994). Nevertheless, statistical significance of the APT hypothesis
proved the informational efficiency of the Russian market (see, for ex-
ample, Elton, Gruber, Blake, 1995).
All the RTS stocks' dependence on the general default risk parameter
appeared insignificant, and this parameter is omitted in Appendix C. This
evidence can be explained by the peculiarities of the Russian corporate
financing procedure. Actually, financial debt share in the firms' liabilities
rarely exceeds 10–15% in Russia, and investors never consider financial
credits as an actual capital resource for corporations. Nearly all the
loans' aim was to support the short-term working capital ones (accord-
ing to the Central Bank's annual report, they amount to about 96% of
the total bank loans value).
One can also see that the dependence on the RTS index was positive
and 5%-significant for all the stocks under consideration. It is not differ-
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ent to understand that this finding can not be the simple consequence
of the procedure of RTS index calculation from the stocks' averaged
values.
The last result allows to make some conclusions on the problem of
hedging the RTS assets portfolios. For example, hedging by negative di-
versification methods seems impossible, but the stock securities could
be hedged by the GKO/OFZ portfolio. All the companies' stocks except
the steel ones have a significant negative correlation with the GKO/OFZ
market. This is quite clear for liquid alternative instruments.
Two steel industry companies, Norilskiy Nikel and Nizhniy Tagil Metal
Plant, were 'suffering' from the increasing of the exchange rate. Note
that these companies were especially controlled by foreign investors
(namely, by The TransWorldMetal Group). In the same time, main pack-
ages of their stocks were owned by the Russian banks (UNEXIM and
Menatep, respectively). That allows to present the hypothesis of such an
abnormal behavior of those stocks: foreign investors are still interested
in increasing their share in the companies' capital. Consequently, the
Russian market agents must increase the USD stock prices when the
ruble's rate decreases to prevent an immediate take-off.
It is also interesting to mention that assets dependencies on the RTS in-
dex appeared extremely volatile — they varied for more that ten times
while the fluctuation of assets' dependence on alternative instruments
(especially on GKO/OFZ bonds and currency instruments) changed for
only two or three times. Possibly, this can be explained by the fact that
the main Russian market investors did not consider all the RTS assets
as competitive ones while other financial instruments (for instance,
GKO/OFZ bonds or foreign currency) were treated as actual investment
alternatives.
Finally, the RTS stocks dependence on the GDP and inflation (CPI) fac-
tors were significant for the most companies, but their direction had no
evident tendency and changed from one sector to another. This fact can
be explained, for example, by different sensitivity of  the firms' incomes
and expenses to the inflation shocks and gross demand changes. This
can also be explained especially by the changes in the government
regulation policy that play an important role in the Russian capital mar-
ket pricing. We shall discuss the topic more carefully below. Another
possible explanation is that GDP- and CPI-dependencies were already
covered by the currency exchange factor. In fact, Statistica 5.0 proce-
dure used the stepwise 2SLS procedure with automatic elimination of
the factors cross-correlation that was rather significant (see Table 3.).
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The author also reminds that investors were especially interested in
such regional parameters as the consumer price index instead of the
GDP value during the recession sub-period (November 1997 – June
1998). Moreover, the two macroeconomic parameters appeared less
dependent of each other in that period.
3.2. Sector indices behavior and policy recommendations
3.2.1. Basic assumptions and the model. In this section, the author
studies the principal industrial indices. The author supposes investors
never not pay attention to all the existing factors but to some subset of
them (which may vary from time to time). Other factors are considered
temporally ignorable by the market.
In each period, government policy can directly affect only few variables
of those determining the capital market (namely, the factors called EFs).
And, provided some factor is not relevant in the period, its regulation
does not affect the capital investments to the real sector. On the con-
trary, it may support speculative expectations of the investors in the
same period and raise speculative profits. By analogy, not influencing
the market in the periods when the government can affect the relevant
variables, leads to the extraordinary passivity of the market in the future.
The whole period (January 1997 – June 1998) was separated into six 3-
month sub-periods, each of them consisting of about 63 data. For each
period, regressions of the industries' indices were tested according to
the following model:
Pit = iTα +
)1(
iTβ (PCRt – CBRt) + )2(iTβ GKO1Yt  + )3(iTβ EXRt +
+ )4(iTβ GDPt–40 + )5(iTβ RTSt + )6(iTβ CPIt–60 + itε , (3.4)
Table 3. Factor correlation coefficients (5%-significant coefficients bolded).
Deft. risk GKO/OFZ $ GDP RTS CPI
Deft. risk   1.00 –0.21   0.14   0.19   0.34   0.10
GKO/OFZ –0.21   1.00   0.54   0.49 –0.46   0.59
$   0.14   0.54   1.00   0.68 –0.17   0.67
GDP   0.19   0.49   0.68   1.00 –0.12   0.77
RTS   0.34 –0.46 –0.17 –0.12   1.00 –0.34
CPI   0.10   0.59   0.67   0.77 –0.34   1.00
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where T = 1, 2, …, 6 is the sub-period number. Only signs and signifi-
cance of the corresponding coefficients were tested.
The author classified the sub-periods as periods when economic or
speculative factors were more or less important. For the classification,
the author used the percent share of total variance of the asset price
explained by SFs and EFs (see (3.1)). The percentage explained by the
economic factors variance was compared to its average value.20 Results
are presented in Appendix D.
3.2.2. Sector indices regression results and recommendations
for political influence. Oil and gas industry. This sector of the industry
is the leading one in the Russian economy, and the most profitable one.
In 1997, oil and gas exporting companies formed about 67% of the total
federal tax payments (Russian State Tax Inspection data). Consequently,
this sector of the economy is the most regulated one. As being the ba-
sic energy supplying sector, oil and especially gas industries suffer from
the negative processes in the economy and from the control over the
output prices.
From the table in Appendix D we see that the GDP influence upon the
sector index is significant and shows the stable  tendency to decrease
from positive to negative values (via close to zero and insignificant
ones). This is an evidence of increasing non-payments for the energy
resources and of decreasing of the real GDP value (see Dynnikova,
1998).
Much more information can be derived from the oil and gas industry's
dependence on the CPI index: it was negative, but insignificant for four
of six sub-periods except the autumn of 1997 when the significance was
high and positive.
That allows an easy explanation in terms of the regulation policy. Actu-
ally, at the end of 1997, energy suppliers managed to abolish temporally
the major price regulations in some regions and to raise their prices.
This led to inflation shocks and to the increase in their stock values as
well, resulting in their high positive correlation. Of course, they tried to
increase their prices according to the inflation rate in other periods, too.
Sometimes they succeeded, but, normally, oil and gas prices suffered
from the state limitations. This led to insignificant and even negative de-
pendence of the oil and gas industry index upon the CPI value in other
periods.
                                               
20 Ratkovicova (1998) used the same technique for the CEE capital indices, but
she divided factors into groups of 'domestic' and 'foreign' ones.
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Decreasing significance of dependence of the oil and gas industry index
on such a speculative factor as the GKO/OFZ and its weak dependence
on the USD rate may be estimated favorable: this is the only sector of
the Russian economy that remains attractive for investors independently
of the alternative profit opportunities. This means that relaxation of the
government control may increase investments greatly. Moreover, it
might be done independently of the state financial policy in other sec-
tors of the economy
Electric power supply. This is the second mostly regulated (especially by
the regional institutes) sector and the only one where foreign investors
own a considerable share of the companies (10–15% on the average).
Moreover, the top UES managers including B.Brevnov and A.Chubais
demonstrated the support to foreign investors (especially in spring 1998
when the State Duma voted for the limitation of the foreign investors'
capital share). However, there exists a widely spread and stable opinion
that the electric industry is heavily controlled by the foreigners (espe-
cially by the Bank of NY), and this can explain the significant positive
dependence of the electricity index upon the USD rate.
The electric power industry suffers the serious control from by the state
officials. Usually, enforcing and softening the price regulations take
place for all the sectors simultaneously: it follows from the comparison
of  the CPI-dependence of the electric companies' index with the index
of the oil and gas industry. Normally, both of those dependence coeffi-
cients were negative. However, for the electric power the negative de-
pendence was significant for all the periods except the end of 1997
while the oil and gas industry's coefficients showed the opposite be-
havior. This simply means that the electricity prices were always con-
trolled more severely than those in oil and gas industry. Even in the pe-
riod of softening the policy regulation in the late in the late 1997 this
factor remained important.
The electric power sector needs more reasonable government control: it
can not be considered only as the second one whose prices affect the
CPI index and consumers welfare.  Softening the state control together
with overcoming the discrimination of sectoral investors may attract
capital inflows. This sector showed an outstanding liquidity of stocks
(see Appendix D), and hence it also needed the decrease in the alter-
native rates of return. In fact, its index has a considerable negative de-
pendence on the GKO/OFZ market, though decreasing in absolute
value.
Telecommunications sector's behavior is very unstable. The reason for
this instability is still unclear though the author can propose some ex-
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planations. A very probable one is that this sector's stocks are the only
Russian stocks with a considerable dividend outcome. Consequently,
these stocks behavior is essentially controlled by the strategic, not
portfolio investors, whose decisions are less dependent of the other
market assets' behavior. The state economic policy seemed not to af-
fect this sector until now. But fortunately, the Russian telecommunica-
tions sector grows because of the necessity to follow the international
telecommunications standards and especially due to the Internet facili-
ties development.
The steel industry and machinery sectors demonstrate a decreasing de-
pendence on economic factors and a significant dependence on
speculative ones. This shows that investors consider these sectors' se-
curities as ones that can not bring any operational profits and hence
remain essentially speculative ones. This is a very convenient period for
the state take-off those securities for low prices (such policy has been
effectively followed by the Moscow and Novgorod regional officials).
The government demand for these sectors' output and relatively cheap
loans guaranteed by the state seem to be able to increase the sectors
production much faster than the required investments that seem un-
available now.
3.2.3. Summary of the factor analysis. The factor analysis proce-
dure (principal components method — see ASQC/AIAG, 1991) was used
for testing the adequacy of the set of factors to the market data. This is
a standard way of testing the author's regressive hypothesis (see, for
example, Chen, Roll, Ross (1986) and others). For all the 24 issues'
price time series presented in Appendix C, significant factor time series
were derived. Although only three factors were found significant by the
principal components procedure, the general choice of pre-determined
factors was found adequate.
The factor time series were investigated by the standard regressive
analysis with the main economic variables for the period from January
1997 until June 1998. The variables appeared to be significantly corre-
lated with the RTS index (general) (86%-correlation with the main fac-
tor), monthly GDP (58%-correlation with the second factor; for the re-
cession sub-period GDP factor was replaced by CPI – see below), and
GKO/OFZ price index (52%-correlation with the third factor). See Ap-
pendix E for the shares of the total RTS assets' variance explained by
the factors.
The factor analysis was also conducted for the RTS growth (January
1997 – October 1997) and recession (November 1997 – June 1998)
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sub-periods. Factor analysis results for both sub-periods are also pre-
sented in Appendix E.
For example, it was found that during the recession sub-period investors
were especially interested in such regional parameters as the consumer
price index instead of the GDP value being dominant during the growth
period.
4. CONCLUSION
4.1. Short summary of main results
In this paper, it was shown that the Russian capital market behaved ef-
fectively (in the weak sense) during the period of its stable development
from January 1997 until June 1998. This means that investors had unbi-
ased estimations of the future return both in the short and in the long
run. This conclusion was made from the analysis of the inter-market ar-
bitrage opportunities between the RTS stock market and alternative fi-
nancial investments including the GKO/OFZ bonds and the foreign cur-
rency.21
The result appears close to that for the Eastern Europe capital markets
(see Ratkovicova, 1998 or Fiszeder, 1999), though this paper analyzed
the shorter time period and more attention was paid to inter-market re-
lations instead of global factors.
For the short run, the author investigated the arbitrage between the
competing financial instruments. Operational cash flows were assumed
stable for all the stocks; in this case, the fluctuations of the alternative
instruments' return were considered the only factors affected their
prices. Froot–Obstfeld (1991) model (2.4) was used for theoretical cal-
culations of the short run equilibrium prices when no trend shifts were
expected.
The Froot–Obstfeld's formula states that the prices should depend of
the three terms calculated from the discounted cash flows, speculative
bubble and the time-choice pricing, respectively. All the terms appeared
significant for the market price-making, hence showing that the RTS in-
vestors used all the existing profit opportunities, both speculative and
operational ones, effectively. This result is supported by the high
                                               
21 Some authors (see, for example, Ratkovicova, 1998) show that the RTS market
does not demonstrate an efficient behavior if the alternative markets are ex-
cluded from the analysis.
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(84.6%) correlation between the theoretically computed and actual RTS
indices. It shows that even short run RTS securities prices could not be
drawn from technical trading parameters only. Moreover, significant
negative correlation between the RTS index and alternative instruments
volatility was detected.
However, the difference between the two indices depended on the co-
integration between the RTS capitalization and such exogenous pa-
rameter as the Central Bank reserves. This shows that the Russian mar-
ket still kept many inefficiencies in its behavior, which were due partly to
the government influence.
Another type of inefficiency was found while testing the bid–ask spreads
for various groups of the RTS assets. Only top liquid stocks appeared
consistent with unbiased expectations hypothesis while others beard
more noise, depending on their operational cash flows. The amplitude of
the second-class 'blue chips' fluctuation was found lower than that pre-
dicted from their volatility analysis, while the most illiquid assets' behav-
ior appeared to be the most unstable.
For the long run, the risks in operational cash flows were included into
the model together with the risks of inter-market arbitrage operations.
The arbitrage pricing theory model was used for the long run analysis.
The long run weak efficiency was proved by the significance of the APT
regressive equation (3.2). Simultaneously, two long run economic fac-
tors affecting the prices were detected: they were the GDP value and
the CPI, respectively.
The factors influence was found time-unstable and significantly depend-
ent on the state economic policy. The share of the total prices' variance
explained by economic factors was considerably different among the in-
dustrial sectors and varied from time to time according to political
regulation (see Appendix D). Telecommunications and oil and gas in-
dustries appeared to be the most dependent on EFs, but the latter's
dependence was very unstable due to the state influence upon the rate
of inflation.
The significance of industrial indices' dependence upon various factors
was used for some economic policy recommendations in order to
stimulate new investments. For example, softening the price regulations
for the oil and gas industry might raise the capitalization of this sector.
The electric power industry securities appeared to be more speculative
than other sectors' ones but more sensitive to regulative influence; in
order to attraction the new investments to this sector, it may be suffi-
cient to decrease the alternative rates of return.
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4.2. Paper's assumptions and their possible improvements
The main results of the research were based on two equilibrium con-
cepts: rational expectations hypothesis (2.1) by Modigliani, Miller (1961)
and its variant (2.2)–(2.3) called the Local Expectations Hypothesis
(LEH, see Ramaswamy, Sundaresan, 1986) for the short run and the Ar-
bitrage Pricing Theory (1.2) and (3.2) for the long run. All the assump-
tions and limitations of these theories are also valid for the results of this
paper. The author should point out the most important of them.
For instance, the rational expectations hypothesis assumes the exis-
tence of some exogenous required rate of return that is usually sup-
posed riskless but whose determination is questionable in the case
when all assets are fluctuate. The author used GKO/OFZ bond rates or
the forex returns as proxies for the required rates for the RTS market,
but the Froot–Obstfeld model showed that those estimations were
slightly biased.
Moreover, LEH (2.1) hypothesis assumes the agents' risk-neutrality.22
This assumption may also seem too strong in the case of volatile Rus-
sian market.
Both points allow various improvements, say, by means of modeling
some popular risk management strategy (and considering no alternative
asset at all or perfectly determining it) or by constructing the self-
financing riskless portfolio of the Russian assets23.
As for the APT model, the factor set, though appeared to be significant,
could be chosen differently. For instance, the regional and institutional
                                               
22  The Black–Scholes–Merton theory is applicable in the case when 1) the asset
is taken as a definite derivative from another instrument or index; 2) those
instruments are "freely and instantaneously tradable either long or short at
the price quoted" (Baxter, Rennie, 1999, p. 83). Under these assumptions,
Black–Scholes techniques show that non-arbitrage assumptions lead to existence
of a unique riskless hedged portfolio of the asset and underlying instrument. That
portfolio must yield the riskless rate, and this leads to a precise expression for
the derivative asset price. Unfortunately, some of the Black–Scholes assumptions
are violated for the Russian market. For example, the RTS market has no perfect
derivatives and does not allow the short selling. and because of respective sim-
plicity of the LEH formulas. Alternatively, the LEH method produces the formula
for the expected asset's value only, but it is applicable for derivatives and for
other instruments, too. It is less precise and risk-neutral as assumes that, on the
average, the risky asset should earn the alternative (say, riskless) rate. The LEH
technique is also preferable for its relative simplicity.
23 The second way may lead to calculation of the Russian market unit risk price
but the author expects that such a portfolio is not unique because of the market
incompleteness. Hence this method turns useless.
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parameters may appear significant for the RTS assets. Moreover, the
residuals behavior (see (3.2)) must be more complicated that in OLS
APT model. The ARCH/GARCH model may explain more variance and
appear to be more consistent. Unfortunately, short time series of reli-
able data for the long run parameters can make such improvements dif-
ficult.
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APPENDICES
A. Option values calculation
1. F can be found from the LEH equation
.)( FrdtdF =E  (A.1)
which means that expected short run cash outcome from holding the
option must be equal to that from investment of the same amount into
alternative instruments.24
Evidently, the option value depends upon the market price P of an asset
and does not depend on the time variable: F = F(P). Using (2.14), one
can write the Itô's differential for the F 's value:
.22
2
1
dzPFdtPFdtFPdF ′σ+′µ+″σ=
where primes stand for derivatives with respect to P, or
.)( 22
2
1
dtPFdtFPdF ′µ+″σ=E (A.2)
Finally, substitution of (A.2) into (A.1) leads to (2.15):
.022
2
1
=−
′µ+″σ FrPFFP (À.3)
Analogously, from the correspondent equation for V:
dtrVdtDdV =+)(E , (A.4)
where D stands for the cash flow per period, we get the equation (2.16):
.022
2
1
=+−′µ+″σ DVrPVVP (À.5)
                                               
24 Note that, though F depends on the current asset A price, (A.1) does not imply
that anyone can combine any hedging portfolio from A and the correspondent
option and keep it riskless by free reallocation of its components. This is impos-
sible at least for the reason that Section 2.2 deals with the market where the
traded bid and ask prices differ. (A.1) shows only that the average return for the
option must satisfy the general market rate requirements.
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2. According to (2.21) and (2.22), we have
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B. Actual RTS and theoretically calculated and bid-ask spreads
First period — 05.01.97–26.10.97,
Second period — 27.10.97–30.06.98.
RTS Index (total)
First period Second period
Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % 0,27 Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % –0.38
Mean log deviation σ, % 1,99 Mean log deviation σ, %   7.02
Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, % 3 Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, %   5
Alternative
rates, % ∗P
∗P
Alternative
rates, % ∗P
∗P
35 346.6 548.3 45 296.9 490.8
45 290.8 442.5 55 286.1 469.5
55 253.4 353.9 65 276.7 451.2
75 268.5 435.3
85 261.2 421.3
95 254.7 408.9
105 248.8 397.8
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Continued from p. 43
Unified Energy System (EESR)
First period Second period
Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % 0.24 Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % –0.36
Mean log deviation σ, % 2.92 Mean log deviation σ, %   7.02
Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, % 1 Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, %   1
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
35 0.18 0.44 45 0.23 0.36
45 0.15 0.35 55 0.22 0.34
55 0.13 0.31 65 0.21 0.33
75 0.20 0.32
85 0.19 0.30
95 0.19 0.29
105 0.18 0.28
Lukoil Holding (LKOH)
First period Second period
Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % 0.12 Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % –0.23
Mean log deviation σ, % 1.79 Mean log deviation σ, %   2.36
Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, % 1 Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, %   1
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
35 16.08 25.04 45 18.64 24.42
45 11.68 17.25 55 17.76 23.16
55 9.35 13.38 65 17.01 22.10
75 16.36 21.19
85 15.80 20.39
95 15.30 19.70
105 14.86 19.08
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St. Petersburg TelNet (SPTL)
First period Second period
Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % 0.11 Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % –0.33
Mean log deviation σ, % 3.83 Mean log deviation σ, %   5.50
Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, % 6 Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, %   10
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
35 0.92 2.64 45 0.93 2.58
45 0.78 2.11 55 0.90 2.46
55 0.69 1.77 65 0.87 2.35
75 0.84 2.26
85 0.82 2.18
95 0.80 2.11
105 0.78 2.04
Orenburgneft Oil (ORNB)
First period Second period
Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % 0.10 Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % –0.70
Mean log deviation σ, % 2.81 Mean log deviation σ, %   4.99
Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, % 6 Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, %   9
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
35 3.18 8.14 45 3.75 8.63
45 2.41 5.56 55 3.67 8.38
55 1.98 4.29 65 3.59 8.16
75 3.52 7.96
85 3.46 7.78
95 3.41 7.62
105 3.36 7.47
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Continued from p. 45
Moscow Main Supermarket (GUMM)
First period Second period
Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % 0.31 Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % –0.33
Mean log deviation σ, % 2.03 Mean log deviation σ, %   2.53
Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, % 4 Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, %   7
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
35 2.31 5.92 45 1.78 4.89
45 1.57 4.22 55 1.72 4.66
55 1.25 3.47 65 1.67 4.47
75 1.62 4.30
85 1.58 4.15
95 1.54 4.01
105 1.51 3.90
KAMAZ Motor Plant (KMAZ)
First period Second period
Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % 0.13 Mean log rate (weekly) µ, % –0.61
Mean log deviation σ, % 2.27 Mean log deviation σ, %   5.44
Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, % 7 Spread coefficient ∆a, ∆b, %   15
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
Alternative
rates, % ,∗P  USD ,
∗P  USD
35 0.85 3.62 45 1.25 3.85
45 0.55 1.69 55 1.22 3.72
55 0.42 1.13 65 1.20 3.60
75 1.17 3.50
85 1.15 3.41
95 1.13 3.33
105 1.11 3.25
APPENDICES 47
Ñ. Regressive coefficients
*** — 1%-significance (t1%(316) = 2.59); ** — 5%-significance (t5%(316) = 1.97);
* — 10%- significance (t10%(316) = 1.65).
Constant term GDP
Stock R2
coeff. norm. t coeff. norm. t
Electricity
Krasnoyarskenergo *0.86 –2.74 –7.41 ***–2.95 –0.008 –0.022 ***–8.80
Lenenergo *0.87 –11.3 –15.63 ***–7.90 –0.011 –0.015 ***–18.4
Lenenergo pref. *0.88 –6.14 –19.19 ***–6.41 –0.004 –0.013 ***–21.8
Mosenergo *0.83 –3.52 –2.67     –1.13   0.001   0.001 ***–6.91
Novosibirskenergo *0.95   346.3   34.53   ***10.91   0.086   0.009   ***6.59
Unified Energy Sys. *0.94   0.741   2.68       1.51 –0.004 –0.014 ***–5.68
Unified Energy pref. *0.96 –2.87 –13.13 ***–9.96 –0.003 –0.014 ***–7.94
Sverdlovskenergo *0.91 –7.31 –12.39 ***–6.66 –0.003 –0.005 ***–11.0
Oil & gas
Lukoil *0.94   6.795   0.39       0.28   0.169   0.010   ***17.17
Lukoil pref. *0.90 –282. –25.75 ***–11.6   0.093   0.008   ***9.32
Orenburgneft *0.91 –32.2 –6.14 ***–3.47 –0.042 –0.008 ***–11.9
Surgutneftegas *0.86   33.14   63.09   ***17.03 –0.011 –0.021 ***–12.7
Tatneft *0.96 –2745 –27.77 ***–18.4   0.959   0.010   ***15.64
Tomskneft *0.86   97.97   9.82   ***5.67 –0.053 –0.005 ***–7.17
Yugneftegas *0.86   524.8   37.61   ***10.10   0.105   0.008   ***4.95
Yugneftegas pref. *0.87   402.6   36.77   ***12.73   0.065   0.006   ***5.01
Telecommunications
MGTS (Moscow) *0.93 –7781 –8.94 ***–2.72 –12.401 –0.014 ***–10.6
SPb TelNet (SPb) *0.85 –4.72 –3.02     –1.22 –0.001 –0.001 ***–3.03
SPb TelNet pref. *0.86 –14.7 –13.13 ***–3.31 –0.002 –0.002   ***3.65
Rostelecom *0.86   39.03   10.87   ***7.86 –0.023 –0.006 ***–11.1
Rostelecom pref. *0.84   7.692   3.07    **2.03 –0.011 –0.004 ***–11.0
Metal
MGTZ (Moscow) *0.93   41.42   19.09   ***5.29 –0.001   0.000 ***–3.72
N.-Tagil Metal. Plant *0.93   3.250   40.63   ***14.08   0.021   0.263   ***3.77
Norilskiy Nikel *0.95   221.9   29.72   ***14.02   0.085   0.011   ***13.11
Norilskiy Nikel pref. *0.90   159.2   26.94   ***8.23   0.104   0.018   ***13.19
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Continued from p. 47
CPI RTS Index
Stock R2
coeff. norm. t coeff. norm. t
Electricity
Krasnoyarskenergo *0.86    1.414   3.82    **2.14 0.001 0.0027 ***31.13
Lenenergo *0.87   0.625   0.86       0.61 0.001 0.0014 ***30.59
Lenenergo pref. *0.88   0.201   0.63       0.29 0.000 0.0000 ***22.16
Mosenergo *0.83   15.55   11.78   ***3.59 0.002 0.0015 ***12.88
Novosibirskenergo *0.95  270. –26.92 ***–11.9 0.053 0.0053 ***42.83
Unified Energy Sys. *0.94  2.01 –7.27 ***–5.73 0.000 0.0000 ***48.77
Unified Energy pref. *0.96   1.226   5.61   ***5.96 0.000 0.0000 ***67.39
Sverdlovskenergo *0.91   2.206   3.74   ***2.82 0.001 0.0017 ***45.65
Oil & gas
Lukoil *0.94    52.72   2.99   ***3.07 0.031 0.0018 ***32.88
Lukoil pref. *0.90    253.1   23.11   ***14.57 0.028 0.0026 ***30.08
Orenburgneft *0.91  –23.0 –4.38 ***–3.48 0.014 0.0027 ***39.30
Surgutneftegas *0.86  –26.8 –51.02 ***–19.3 0.000 0.0000 ***12.33
Tatneft *0.96    1958.   19.81  ***18.41 0.216 0.0022 ***36.80
Tomskneft *0.86  –110. –11.03 ***–8.94 0.021 0.0021 ***32.27
Yugneftegas *0.86  –305. –21.86 ***–8.24 0.058 0.0042 ***28.69
Yugneftegas pref. *0.87  –266. –24.29 ***–11.8 0.019 0.0017 ***15.38
Telecommunications
MGTS (Moscow) *0.93 –5267 –6.05  **–2.58 5.620 0.0065 ***49.93
SPb TelNet (SPb) *0.85   1.220   0.78       0.445 0.004 0.0026 ***28.43
SPb TelNet pref. *0.86 –11.2 –10.00  **–2.44 0.010 0.0089 ***23.14
Rostelecom *0.86 –33.6 –9.36 ***–9.52 0.006 0.0017 ***34.14
Rostelecom pref. *0.84 –7.80 –3.11 ***–2.89 0.002 0.0008 ***20.12
Metal
MGTZ (Moscow) *0.93 –20.7 –9.54     –0.93 0.016 0.0074 ***52.75
N.-Tagil Metal. Plant *0.93 –2.34 –29.25 ***–14.2 0.000 0.0000 ***39.03
Norilskiy Nikel *0.95 –88.7 –11.88 ***–7.87 0.032 0.0043 ***51.60
Norilskiy Nikel pref. *0.90 –52.0 –8.80 ***–3.78 0.024 0.0041 ***31.87
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GKO/OFZ USD
Stock R2
coeff. norm. t coeff. norm. t
Electricity
Krasnoyarskenergo *0.86 –0.13 –0.35 ***–18.4   0.367   0.99   ***3.96
Lenenergo *0.87 –0.25 –0.35 ***–19.6   2.315   3.20   ***16.15
Lenenergo pref. *0.88 –0.07 –0.22 ***–6.96   1.392   4.35   ***14.57
Mosenergo *0.83 –0.94 –0.71 ***–9.66   1.99   1.51 ***–4.88
Novosibirskenergo *0.95 –12.2 –1.22 ***–44.9   18.75   1.87 ***–5.92
Unified Energy Sys. *0.94 –0.17 –0.61 ***–47.0   0.248   0.90   ***5.06
Unified Energy pref. *0.96 –0.12 –0.55 ***–56.4   0.312   1.43    **10.83
Sverdlovskenergo *0.91 –0.21 –0.36   ***45.65   1.084   1.84   ***9.89
Oil & gas
Lukoil *0.94 –7.69 –0.44 ***–28.1   15.66   0.89   ***6.52
Lukoil pref. *0.90 –5.32 –0.49 ***–24.1   2.570   0.23       1.05
Orenburgneft *0.91 –2.59 –0.49 ***–37.3   11.46   2.18      *1.95
Surgutneftegas *0.86 –0.21 –0.40 ***–5.22   0.745   1.42 ***–3.83
Tatneft *0.96 –55.2 –0.56 ***–23.1   107.3   1.09       0.72
Tomskneft *0.86 –3.80 –0.38   ***28.94   3.569   0.36    **2.07
Yugneftegas *0.86 –12.0 –0.86 ***–34.2 –43.7 –3.13 ***–8.43
Yugneftegas pref. *0.87 –5.08 –0.46 ***–21.9 –26.1 –2.38 ***–8.29
Telecommunications
MGTS (Moscow) *0.93 –1097 –1.26 ***–10.7   2654   3.05   ***9.31
SPb TelNet (SPb) *0.85 –2.59 –1.66 ***–37.3   0.823   0.53    **2.15
SPb TelNet pref. *0.86 –0.71 –0.63 ***–31.2   1.82   1.63    **2.20
Rostelecom *0.86 –0.96 –0.27 ***–19.0   0.107   0.03       0.22
Rostelecom pref. *0.84 –0.31 –0.12 ***–8.81   0.914   0.36    **2.42
Metal
MGTZ (Moscow) *0.93 –2.84 –1.31      *1.76   3.451   1.59 ***–4.42
N.-Tagil Metal. Plant *0.93 –0.07 –0.88    *–1.93 –0.18 –2.25 ***–7.82
Norilskiy Nikel *0.95 –6.31 –0.85     –0.1 –27.2 –3.64 ***–17.2
Norilskiy Nikel pref. *0.90 –5.56 –0.94     –1.53 –23.2 –3.93 ***–12.0
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D. Regressive coefficients fluctuations
*** — 1%-significance; ** — 5%-significance; * — 10%-significance.
3-month
periogs
Default
risk
GKO/OFZ USD GDP RTS CPI
EF var,
%%
Oil & gas
01.97–03.97   –0.015   ***0.211     –0.340    ***0.032 ***0.001    –2.344 3.63
04.97–06.97     0.067   ***0.563     –0.079    ***0.003 ***0.002    –1.062 4.71
07.97–09.97     0.389   **–1.681     –4.643      –0.001 ***0.001  ***26.832 11.22
10.97–12.97   –0.079    ***0.452  **–1.133  ***–0.021 ***0.001  ***9.043 9.33
01.98–03.98     0.078      –0.131       0.734  ***–0.014 ***0.001    –1.026 5.64
04.98–06.98     0.010      –0.038      *1.071  ***–0.023 ***0.002    –2.895 5.42
Electricity
01.97–03.97   –0.033  ***–0.622     **1.781        0.002 ***0.003 ***–4.572 0.98
04.97–06.97     0.059  ***–0.615   ***2.883  ***–0.002 ***0.003 ***–13.054 1.23
07.97–09.97   –0.045  ***–0.723      *1.067      –0.004 ***0.002    *–5.041 0.76
10.97–12.97 ***0.151  ***–0.419      –0.341        0.001 ***0.001       2.063 0.88
01.98–03.98   –0.094  ***–0.405     **1.767      –0.003 ***0.002  **–9.081 0.95
04.98–06.98     0.096   **–0.226     **4.647     *–0.016 ***0.002  **–25.002 1.01
Telecommunications
01.97–03.97     0.016       *0.170    ***2.631  ***–0.001 ***0.001 ***–10.041 9.56
04.97–06.97   –0.105  ***–0.811    ***3.583     *–0.013     0.001 ***–17.071 10.53
07.97–09.97     0.127    **–0.513      –1.312        0.001 ***0.002      *7.433 9.92
10.97–12.97     0.005       –0.106  ***–1.701        0.001 ***0.003   ***10.045 12.37
01.98–03.98   –0.131  ***–0.321     **1.607     *–0.005 ***0.003   **–7.721 9.64
04.98–06.98     0.042  ***–0.221      –0.791        0.004 ***0.002       4.581 8.99
Machinery
01.97–03.97   –0.034        0.053    ***1.561        0.008 ***–0.001 ***–8.531 4.86
04.97–06.97    *0.201  ***–0.551  ***–3.423        0.007 ***0.002   ***18.321 4.98
07.97–09.97     0.237  ***–2.600  ***–10.012    ***0.061 ***0.001   ***49.441 5.10
10.97–12.97   –0.186   **–0.479       *0.126      –0.001  **0.001       0.129 4.75
01.98–03.98  **0.344     *–0.077    **–0.250     *–0.007 ***0.001       2.088 3.48
04.98–06.98     0.055     *–0.008     *–2.501        0.005 ***0.002      *14.021 2.92
Metal
01.97–03.97   –0.005   **–0.172  ***–2.003      –0.003 ***0.001 ***11.902 4.56
04.97–06.97     0.158     *–0.117  ***–2.723      *0.009 ***0.000 ***13.900 3.98
07.97–09.97    *0.573      –0.005       –1.061      –0.009 ***0.001      5.805 3.12
10.97–12.97    *0.229     *–0.191    ***2.700  ***–0.001 ***0.002 ***–13.112 2.87
01.98–03.98     0.029  ***–0.401     *–0.327      –0.003 ***0.001      2.687 1.98
04.98–06.98     0.046   **–0.071    **–1.019        0.002 ***0.002      5.582 2.04
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E. RTS factors significance
Appendix contains data on factor variables correlation with major eco-
nomic indices (grey) together with variance percentage explained by
factor variables is also presented.
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